Fall, 1992 (v5n1)
Goodall, Merrill
Presentation at Water in California Agriculture:
Technology, Politics, and People. A conference held June
13, 1991, Sacramento, CA.
Reviewer's note: The following article summarizes a presentation
given at a conference on "Water in California Agriculture:
Technology, Politics, and People", June 13, 1991 in Sacramento,
California sponsored by the National Center for Appropriate Technology
and La Cooperativa Campesina de California with support from PG
& E.
Much of the farmland in California's San Joaquin Valley is dependent on water imported by the Federal Government's Central Valley Project (CVP) and the state of California's State Water Project (SWP). These multi-billion dollar projects bring water through hundreds of miles of aqueducts and canals from reservoirs in northern California to the southern and western San Joaquin Valley. Accompanying the construction of this water distribution system was the development of new political institution-water districts-to manage the water deliveries. These water districts are bound contractually to the SWP and the CVP. The nature of the relationship that has emerged between these water districts and the large landowners of the San Joaquin Valley is the subject of Goodall's presentation. Goodall argues that the large landowner has become the dominant partner in the political system, particularly in water institutions. He then documents the rise of property-weighted electoral systems and the erosion of the democratic process in the San Joaquin Valley. Finally, Goodall records the convergence of major organizations-public and private, local and state-and their influence on policy and rural communities.
Land Ownership
Using data from historical documents such as James Bryce's American Commonwealth, published in 1888, to more contemporary studies from the California Institute for Rural Studies and the U.S. Interior Department, Goodall describes the trend toward concentration in land ownership in the San Joaquin Valley. For example, "in the five water districts that take two-thirds of all State Water Project deliveries in the San Joaquin Valley, eight owners account for 60% of the land area." Goodall then goes on to make the connection between ownership pattern, choice of enabling act for water district incorporation, and policy decision making of the districts.
Water Institutions and Local Control
Water districts are legal government entities created by acts
of the state legislature. Goodall points out that petitioners
seeking to initiate a district are in a position to select an
act that defines the electorate in a manner likely to be supportive
of the goals sought by the petitioners.
According to Goodall, there are two distinct types of political
systems characterizing water districts in rural California. One
tends to be democratic and the other, organized by local or absentee
propertied elites, is less so. The water organizations that are
likely to be democratic are located in the Sacramento Valley and
the east side of the San Joaquin Valley. They were settled in
the late 19th century and their water was dependent first on ground
water reserves and streams from the Sierra. These districts were
authorized by the Wright Act of 1887, the state legislature's
first comprehensive enabling act for water district organization.
Voting for directors in irrigation districts is based on one
vote for each registered voter.
Toward the end of the 19th century, this irrigation district movement
was resisted by owners of large properties. Their response was
the California Water District Act of 1913. In districts authorized
by this act, voting was weighted by property; one vote for each
dollar's worth of land.
The Wright Act was responsible for the incorporation of most of
the districts up to the years immediately following World War
II. Since the war, the trend has been for water districts to
select those enabling acts (particularly the California Water
District Law) that restrict participation in district formation
to landowners, and weight voting according to the amount of property
owned. This trend reflects the expansion of irrigable acreage
in the southern and western San Joaquin Valley due to the completion
of the SWP and the CVP. Thus, Goodall concludes, "there
is a simple, straightforward relationship between large corporate
entities and the public agency. Concentrated landownership is
a primary source of political influence and there is a stable
bias in the distribution of public benefits."
Goodall then describes some of his research in which he classified
water districts by the type of enabling act and collected comprehensive
data on elections and financial performance. His results showed
that one person-one vote districts exhibit far greater competitive
electoral performance and were relatively stable, financially,
compared to districts with property-weighted electoral systems.
He also found that those who cannot participate in a district's
decision making are frequently excluded from important benefits.
Where there is differential access to the water system and its
political system, there is also differential effects on the communities
in the district. Goodall cites Isao Fujimoto's work in which
towns were analyzed according to their location in democratic
water districts with small farm operations or undemocratic water
districts with large operations prevailing. Fujimoto found that
the areas characterized by small farm operations have given rise
to democratic political institutions (such as water districts)
and that the towns in these areas are rich and complex in character.
On the other hand, areas in which large farms predominate have
given rise to communities which are relatively simple (few if
any services or institutions) and which tend to have undemocratic
water districts. Similar findings are noted by Professor Dean
MacCannell's studies of the Westland Water District-an area of
extensive landholdings and property- weighted voting in water
districts. Deteriorating rural communities, characterized by
negative social conditions are the norm in this area (see Components
2(3):9-12).
Goodall then looks at the broader picture and observes that there are "social costs as well as environmental costs to the massive interbasin transfer of large quantities of water." He compares general income, poverty, employment, education, and public health statistics between eight northeastern water origin counties and San Joaquin Valley counties and finds a big difference. Goodall concludes that "In the San Joaquin counties, site of an abundant, rich agriculture, by American standards a sharply divided society has emerged. In the northeast, there is readier access to civic institutions and a more nearly even distribution of material reward."
Organizational Convergence
Goodall describes the two major water organizations in California:
(1) the Department of Water Resources which is responsible for
protecting, conserving, developing and managing the state's water;
and (2) the State Water Contractors Corporation which represents
twenty-eight of the thirty water districts which have contracted
for water service from the SWP. These two organizations are dependent
on one another. The Department is financially dependent on the
Contractors Corporation since $711 million is drawn to it annually
from the SWP. The Contractors Corporation is dependent on the
Department for the water. The Department is a public organization,
accountable to the governor and the people of the state. The Contractors
Corporation is a private corporate entity consisting of water
districts, without elected representatives. Yet, Goodall points
out that despite their apparent dissimilarity, they are remarkably
similar. They share personnel with similar values, interests,
backgrounds and expertise. There is a general unity and sense
of consensus among the people of both agencies. Thus, the distinction
between these two agencies is blurred.
Goodall summarizes three trends: (1) an increase in the concentration
in land ownership in the San Joaquin Valley; (2) the expansion
of irrigable acreage in the southern and western Valley and an
increase in water districts with property-weighted electoral systems;
and (3) the convergence of the major public and private water
organizations in the State. Based on these findings, he concludes
that water development is fostering a new political economy in
California. The tendency to weight voting by property has created
new institutional arrangements in which water district priorities
are less likely today to be influenced by the preferences of resident
registered voters. The distinction between political and economic
power and between public and private considerations of welfare
has been blurred. New, private hierarchies have displaced public
organizations and elected representatives so that the participation
of ordinary citizens is now limited. The result, according to
Goodall, is that "both environmental degradation and social
inequity have come to be described as 'development.'" He
ends by suggesting that the process is not complete and that we
monitor these trends and their results on rural communities more
closely as we plan for the future.
For more information write to: Merrill Goodall, The Claremont
Graduate School, 170 E. Tenth St., McManus Hall 225, Claremont,
CA 91711-6163.
(GWF.009)
Contributed by Gail Feenstra
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